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Abstract
The integrity of democratic elections depends on voters’ ac-
cess to accurate information. However, modern media envi-
ronments, which are dominated by social media, provide ma-
licious actors with unprecedented ability to manipulate elec-
tions via misinformation, such as fake news. We study a zero-
sum game between an attacker, who attempts to subvert an
election by propagating a fake new story or other misinfor-
mation over a set of advertising channels, and a defender who
attempts to limit the attacker’s impact. Computing an equi-
librium in this game is challenging as even the pure strategy
sets of players are exponential. Nevertheless, we give prov-
able polynomial-time approximation algorithms for comput-
ing the defender’s minimax optimal strategy across a range of
settings, encompassing different population structures as well
as models of the information available to each player. Ex-
perimental results confirm that our algorithms provide near-
optimal defender strategies and showcase variations in the
difficulty of defending elections depending on the resources
and knowledge available to the defender.
Introduction
Free and fair elections are essential to democracy. How-
ever, the integrity of elections depends on voters’ access
to accurate information about candidates and issues. Often-
times, such information comes via news media or political
advertising. When these information sources are accurate
and transparent, they serve an important role in producing
well-functioning elections. However, because of the great
impact that messaging can have on voter behavior (Ger-
ber, Karlan, and Bergan 2009; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007;
Brader 2005), such information can also subvert legitimate
elections when deliberately falsified by malicious actors.
In traditional media environments, such subversion is
relatively difficult because professional news organizations
serve as gatekeepers to information spread. However, mod-
ern media environments are increasingly decentralized due
to the importance of social networks such as Facebook or
Twitter, which allow outside actors to spread political in-
formation directly amongst voters (Chi and Yang 2011;
Wattal et al. 2010; Holcomb, Gottfried, and Mitchell 2013).
This presents an unprecedented opportunity for malicious
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actors to spread deliberately falsified information – “fake
news” – and in doing so, influence the results of demo-
cratic elections. Such concerns are particularly salient in
light of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Recent research
shows that, on average, an American adult was exposed to
at least one fake news story during the campaign (Allcott
and Gentzkow 2017) and that these stories influenced voter
attitudes (Pennycook, Cannon, and Rand 2017).
Prior work on election control has considered a num-
ber of mechanisms for election interference, including
bribery (Faliszewski et al. 2009; Baumeister et al. 2015;
Erde´lyi, Reger, and Yang 2017; Yang, Shrestha, and Guo
2016), adding or deleting voters (Erde´lyi, Hemaspaandra,
and Hemaspaandra 2015; Loreggia et al. 2015; Faliszewski,
Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra 2011; Liu et al. 2009),
and adding or deleting candidates (Chen et al. 2015; Liu et
al. 2009). Only recently has social influence been explic-
itly studied as a means of election control (Sina et al. 2015;
Wilder and Vorobeychik 2018; Faliszewski et al. 2018). Fur-
ther, with only a few exceptions which do not consider so-
cial influence (Li, Jiang, and Wu 2017; Yin et al. 2018),
election control has so far primarily been studied from the
attacker’s perspective (to establish the computational com-
plexity of controlling an election when the attacker is the
only actor).
We therefore ask the following natural question: how can
a defender mitigate the impact of fake news on an election?
For instance, a social media platform or a news organization
may have the ability to detect and label fake news stories on
a given advertising channel, or propagate a counter-message
with more accurate information. We model this interaction
as a zero-sum game between an attacker, attempting to influ-
ence voters by advertising on a subset of possible channels,
and a defender who enacts counter-measures on a subset of
channels. The goal for the attacker is to maximize the ex-
pected number of voters who switch to the attacker’s pre-
ferred candidate, whereas the defender’s goal is to minimize
this quantity. Note that in this model the defender is neu-
tral with respect which candidate actually wins; they focus
solely on minimizing the attacker’s malicious influence.
Computing equilibria is computationally challenging due
to the exponential number of possible actions for each
player. Complicating the problem, in practice the defender
may have considerable uncertainty about which candidate
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each voter prefers at the start of the game (information which
is needed to effectively target limited resources). We pro-
vide efficient algorithms, backed by theoretical guarantees
and empirical analysis, across a range of settings:
1. In the disjoint case, each voter can be reached by only one
advertising channel, modeling a case where each channel
corresponds to a different demographic group. We give an
FPTAS for the minimax equilibrium strategies.
2. In the nondisjoint case, each voter can be reached by an
arbitrary set of channels. We first prove that the associ-
ated computational problem is APX-hard. We then pro-
vide an algorithm with a bicriteria guarantee: it guaran-
tees the defender a constant-factor approximation to the
optimal payoff but relaxes the budget constraint.
3. We consider three models of uncertainty about voter pref-
erences. The first is stochastic uncertainty where the pref-
erence profile is drawn from a distribution. The second
is asymmetric uncertainty where the preference profile is
drawn from a distribution and the attacker observes the
realized draw. The third is adversarial uncertainty where
the preference profile is chosen to be the worst possible
for the defender within an uncertainty set. Collectively,
these models allow us to capture a range of assumptions
about the information available to each player. Surpris-
ingly, we show that across all three models, and in both
the disjoint and nondisjoint cases, the defender can ob-
tain exactly the same approximation ratios as when pref-
erences are known exactly.
Problem Formulation
We consider a set of voters V (with |V | = n) and a set of
advertising channels C (with |C| = m). C and V form a bi-
partite graph; that is, each voter is reachable by one or more
advertising channels. The voters participate in an election
between two candidates, ca and cd. An attacker aims to en-
sure that one of these candidates, ca, wins the election. A
defender aims to protect the election against this manipula-
tion. Each voter v has a preferred candidate who they vote
for. Let θv = 1 if v initially prefers cd and 0 otherwise.
The attacker attempts to alter election results by spread-
ing a message (a fake news story) amongst the voters. More
precisely, the attacker has a limited advertising budget and
can send the message through at most ka channels. If chan-
nel u is chosen by the attacker, then any voter v with an edge
to u switches their vote to ca with probability puv , where all
such events are independent. The defender can protect vot-
ers from the attacker’s misinformation, for example by de-
tecting and labeling falsified stories on a given advertising
channel, or by attempting to propagate a counter-message
of their own. If the defender protects channel v, each voter
connected to v is “immunized” against the attacker’s mes-
sage independently with probability quv . The defender may
select up to kd channels.
We model this interaction as a zero-sum game between
the attacker and defender. In this setting, equilibrium strate-
gies are unaffected by whether one party must first com-
mit to a strategy (formally, the Nash and Stackelberg equi-
libria are equivalent). Hence without loss of generality, we
consider a simultaneous-move game and seek to compute a
Nash equilibrium. The defender’s strategy space is all sub-
sets of kd channels to protect, while the attacker’s strategy
space consists of all subsets of ka channels to attack. Hence,
each player has an exponentially large number of pure strate-
gies, substantially complicating equilibrium computation.
We now introduce the attacker’s objective, which deter-
mines the payoffs for the game. When the defender chooses
a set of channels Sd and the attacker chooses Sa, let
f(Sd, Sa) be the expected number of voters who previously
preferred cd but switch their vote to ca. The randomness is
over which voters are reached by the attacker’s message (de-
termined by the probabilities puv and quv). Formally, we can
express f as
f(Sd, Sa) =
∑
v∈V
θv
 ∏
u∈Sd
1− quv
1− ∏
u∈Sa
1− puv

where the first product is the probability that the defender
fails to reach voter v and the second is the probability that
the attacker succeeds. The term θv means that only voters
who initially prefer cd count (since they are the only ones
who can switch). The attacker’s payoff is simply f(Sd, Sa),
while the payoff for the defender is −f(Sd, Sa); in words,
the defender aims to minimize the spread of misinformation.
We consider two models for how the population may be
structured. In the disjoint model, the advertising channels
partition the population so that each voter has an edge to ex-
actly one channel. This models a case where the channels
represent demographic groups and the attacker is deciding
which demographics to target. In the more general nondis-
joint model, voters may be reached through multiple chan-
nels; thus, the edges can form an arbitrary bipartite graph.
We begin by considering the case where θ (the voters’ ini-
tial preferences) are common knowledge. Subsequently, we
consider the setting in which voter preferences are uncertain.
Related Work
We survey related work in two areas. First, recent work in
social choice studies the interaction between social influ-
ence and elections. However, all such work examines the at-
tacker’s problem of manipulating the election, leaving open
the question of how elections can be defended against mis-
information. Most closely related is the work of Wilder
and Vorobeychik (2018), who study the attacker’s problem
of manipulating an election in a model where social influ-
ence spreads amongst voters from an attacker’s chosen “seed
nodes”. However, they do not study the corresponding de-
fender problem. Our model is also somewhat different in
that we consider advertising to voters across a set of chan-
nels, rather than influence among the voters themselves. The
work of Berdereck et al. (2016) is also closely related. They
study the attacker’s problem in a bribery setting where a sin-
gle action (e.g., placing an ad) can sway multiple voters.
Faliszewski et al. (2018) extend this to a domain where the
initially bribed agents can influence others. Bredereck and
Elkind (2017) also study a problem of manipulating diffu-
sions on social networks, though not specifically in the con-
text of elections. Sina et al. (2015) study a different form of
Algorithm 1 FPLT()
1: Arbitrarily initialize S0d and S
0
a
2: for t = t...T do
3: Draw pa, pd uniformly at random from [0, 1 ]
m
4: //TopK returns the set consisting of the indices of the
smallest k entries of the given vector
5: Sta = TopK(
∑t−1
s=1 `(S
s
d) + pa, ka)
6: Std = TopK(
∑t−1
s=1 `(S
s
a) + pd, kd)
7: return {Sta} and {Std}
manipulation, where edges may be added to the graph. To-
gether, this body of work demonstrates substantial interest
in the election control literature in emerging threats such as
fake news. Our contribution is the first study of these prob-
lems from the perspective of a defender.
Second, our work is related to a complementary liter-
ature on budget allocation problems. Budget allocation is
the attacker’s problem in our model with no defender in-
tervention: allocating an advertising budget to maximize the
number of people reached. Efficient algorithms are available
for a number of variants on this model (Alon, Gamzu, and
Tennenholtz 2012; Soma et al. 2014; Miyauchi et al. 2015;
Staib and Jegelka 2017). None of this work studies the
game-theoretic problem of a defender trying to prevent an
attacker from reaching voters. Soma et al. (2014) study a
game where multiple advertisers compete for consumers, but
not where one advertiser solely attempts to block the other.
Their game is a potential game with pure strategy equilib-
ria; however, it is easy to give examples in our model where
the zero-sum nature of the attacker-defender interaction re-
quires randomization. This makes equilibrium computation
harder because we cannot simply use the best response dy-
namics. Our work is also related to the influence blocking
maximization (IBM) problem (He et al. 2012) where one
player attempts to limit the spread of a cascade in a social
network. However, in IBM the starting points of the cascade
are fixed in advance; in our problem the adversary chooses
a randomized strategy to evade the defender.
Disjoint populations
In this setting, the population of voters is partitioned by the
channels. Let Vu denote the set of voters affiliated with chan-
nel u. Exploiting the disjoint structure of the population, we
can use linearity of expectation to rewrite the utility function
f(Sd, Sa) as
∑
u∈Sa\Sd
∑
v∈Vu
θvpuv +
∑
u∈Sa∩Sd
∑
v∈Vu
θvpuv(1− quv)
=
∑
u∈Sa
∑
v∈Vu
θvpuv −
∑
u∈Sa∩Sd
∑
v∈Vu
θvpuvquv.
Importantly, this expression is linear in each player’s de-
cisions. More formally, let 1[S] denote the indicator vec-
tor of a set S. Define the loss vector `(Sa) to have value
1[u ∈ Sa]
∑
v∈Vu θvpuvquv in coordinate u. Then, we have
Algorithm 2 OnlineGradient(η, α, T, ka)
1: x0i =
1
mka
for i = 1...m
2: for t = 1...T do
3: //Greedily maximizes a function subject to budget
4: Std = Greedy(g(·|xta), αkd)
5: ∇t = ∇F (xt−1|Std)
6: xt+1 = Update(xt, ∇t)
7: return {Std}
8: function EXPONENTIATEDGRADIENTUPDATE
9: yt = min{xteη∇t , 1}
10: xt+1 = kay
t
||yt||1
11: function EUCLIDEANUPDATE
12: xt+1 = arg miny∈X ||y − (xt + η∇t)||2
that f(Sd, Sa) =
∑
u∈Sa
∑
v∈Vu θvpuv − 1[Sd]>`(Sa),
where the first term is constant with respect to Sd. Simi-
larly, we can define a loss vector `(Sd) which encapsulates
the attacker’s payoff for any defender action Sd.
To exploit this structure, we employ an algorithmic strat-
egy based on online linear optimization. In such problems,
a player seeks to optimize a (possibly adversarially chosen)
sequence of linear functions over a feasible set. The aim is
to achieve low regret, which measures the gap in hindsight
to the best fixed decision over T rounds. We map online lin-
ear optimization onto our problem as follows. The feasible
set for each player consists of m-dimensional binary vec-
tors, where a 1 indicates that the player has chosen the corre-
sponding channel and a 0 indicates that they have not. A vec-
tor is feasible if it sums to at most kd (for the defender) or ka
(for the attacker). Both the attacker and defender will choose
a series of actions from the corresponding feasible sets. In it-
eration t, if the attacker chooses a set Sta, and the defender
receives a loss vector `(Sta) and suffers loss 1[S
t
d]`(S
t
a). The
attacker’s loss functions are defined similarly.
Each player will generate their actions using the classi-
cal Follow The Perturbed Leader (FTPL) algorithm of Kalai
and Vempala (2005) (Algorithm 1). At each iteration, each
player best responds to the uniform distribution over all
strategies played so far by their opponent, plus a small ran-
dom perturbation. Note that best response here corresponds
to linear optimization over the player’s feasible set. Since
any budget-satisfying vector is feasible, we simply select the
highest-weighted kd elements (or ka for the attacker). Since
FTPL has a no-regret guarantee for online linear optimiza-
tion neither player can gain significantly by deviating from
their history of play once the number of iterations is suffi-
ciently high. More precisely, we have the following:
Theorem 1. With 4n
2 max{ka,kd}
2 iterations of FTPL, uni-
form distributions on {Sta} and {Std} form an -equilibrium.
Nondisjoint populations
When voters may be reachable from multiple advertising
channels, the approach from the previous section breaks
down because utility is no longer linear for either player:
selecting one channel reaches a subset of voters and hence
reduces the gain from selecting additional channels. Indeed,
we can obtain the following hardness result:
Theorem 2. In the nondisjoint setting, computing an opti-
mal defender mixed strategy is APX-hard.
The intuition is that the maximum coverage problem is
essentially a special case of ours. However, diminishing re-
turns provides useful algorithmic structure. Formally, both
players’ best response functions are closely related to sub-
modular optimization problems. A set function is submodu-
lar if for all A ⊆ B and u ∈ V \B, f(B ∪ {u})− f(B) ≤
f(A∪{u})− f(A). We will only deal with monotone func-
tions, where f(A ∪ {u})− f(A) ≥ 0 holds for all A, u.
Our overall approach is to work in the marginal space of
the attacker, by keeping track of only the marginal probabil-
ity that they select each channel. That is, the attacker’s cur-
rent mixed strategy is concisely represented by a fractional
vector x, where xu gives the probability of selecting chan-
nel u. We run an approximate no-regret learning algorithm
to update x over a series of iterations. At each iteration t, x is
updated via a gradient step on a reward function induced by
a set Std played by the defender. Specifically, we will choose
Std to be an approximate best response to the current attacker
mixed strategy.
There are two principal challenges that must be solved to
enable this approach. First, we need to design an appropri-
ate no-regret algorithm for the attacker. This is a challenging
task as the attacker’s utility is no longer linear (or even con-
cave) in the marginal vector x. Second, we need to compute
approximate best responses for the defender, which itself is
NP-hard.
We resolve the first challenge by running an online gra-
dient algorithm for the attacker, where the continuous ob-
jective at each iteration is the multilinear extension of an
objective induced by the defender’s strategy Std. The mul-
tilinear extension is a fractional relaxation of a submodular
set function. We define the multilinear extension F (·, Sd)
induced by a defender strategy Sd as
F (x|Sd) =
∑
v∈V
θv
 ∏
u∈Sd
1− quv
(1− m∏
u=1
1− xupuv
)
That is, F (x|Sd) is the expected value of f(Sd, Sa) when
each channel u is independently included in Sa with proba-
bility xu. This is a special case of the multilinear extension
more generally defined for arbitrary submodular set func-
tions (Calinescu et al. 2011).
While F is in general not concave, we show that gradient-
ascent style algorithms enjoy a no-regret guarantee against
a 12 -approximation of the optimal strategy in hindsight. Our
general strategy is to analyze online mirror ascent for con-
tinuous submodular functions. By making specific choices
for the mirror map, we obtain two concrete algorithms (the
update rules in Algorithm 2). The first is standard online gra-
dient ascent, which takes a gradient step followed by Eu-
clidean projection onto the feasible set X = {x|∑u xu ≤
ka, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}. The second is an exponentiated gradient
algorithm, which scales each entry of x according to the gra-
dient and then normalizes to enforce the budget constraint.
We have the following convergence guarantees:
Theorem 3. Suppose that we apply Algorithm 2 to a se-
quence of multilinear extensions F (·|S1d)...F (·|STd ). Let b =
max|Sd|≤kd,u∈C f(Sd, {u}). Then, after T iterations, we
have that
1
2
max
x∗∈X
T∑
t=1
F (x∗|Std)−
T∑
t=1
F (xt|Std) ≤
√
2LDka
√
T .
where for the exponentiated gradient update, L = b and
Dka = ka log(m) and for the Euclidean update, L = b
√
m
and Dka =
√
ka.
Our proof builds on the fact that for any single con-
tinuous submodular function, any local optimum is a 12 -
approximation to the global optimum and translates this
into the online setting. We remark that a no-regret guaran-
tee for online gradient ascent for submodular functions was
recently shown in (Chen, Hassani, and Karbasi 2018). Our
more general analysis based on mirror ascent gives their re-
sult as a special case, and also allows us to analyze the expo-
nentiated gradient update. The advantage is that the theoreti-
cal convergence rate is substantially better for exponentiated
gradient, reducing the dimension dependence from O(
√
m)
to O(logm). However, we also include the result for online
gradient ascent since it tends to perform better empirically.
The second challenge is computing defender best re-
sponses. We show that the defender’s best response prob-
lem is also closely related to a submodular maximization
problem. Accordingly, we can compute approximate best re-
sponses via a greedy algorithm. Specifically, we show that
the defender can obtain an -approximation to the optimal
best response when the greedy algorithm is given an ex-
panded budget of ln
(
n

)
kd nodes.
In more detail: fix an attacker mixed strategy, de-
noted as σa. The defender best response problem is
min|Sd|≤kd ESa∼σa [f(Sd, Sa)] . That is, we wish to mini-
mize the number of voters who switch their vote, in expecta-
tion over σa. We consider the following equivalent problem
max
|Sd|≤kd
E
Sa∼σa
[f(∅, Sa)− f(Sd, Sa)] ,
i.e., maximizing the number of voters who do not switch
as a result of the defender’s action. Define g(Sd|σa) =
ESa∼σa [f(∅, Sa)− f(Sd, Sa)]. The key observation en-
abling efficient best response computations is the following:
Lemma 1. For any attacker mixed strategy σa, g(·|σa) is a
monotone submodular function.
Accordingly, we can compute -optimal best responses by
running the greedy algorithm with an expanded budget:
Theorem 4. Running the greedy algorithm on the function
g with a budget of ln
(
n

)
kd outputs a set Sd satisfying
ESa∼σa [f(Sd, Sa)] ≤ min|S∗|≤kd ESa∼σa [f(Sd, Sa)] + .
Note that running greedy with the original budget kd
would give a (1 − 1/e) approximation for the function g.
However, a constant factor approximation for maximizing g
may not translate into any approximation for minimizing f
because of the constant term f(∅, Sa) in the definition of g.
Expanding the budget by a logarithmic factor gives a 1 − 
approximation with respect to g, and when  is small enough
the guarantee can be translated back in terms of f .
Combining the no-regret guarantee for the attacker and
the best response approximation guarantee for the defender
yields the following guarantee for the sequence of sets Std:
Theorem 5. After T iterations, let σˆT be the uniform dis-
tribution on S1d ...S
T
d output by Algorithm 2. The defender’s
payoff using σˆT is bounded as
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σˆT
[f(Sd, Sa)] ≤ 2
(
τ + +
√
2LD√
T
)
.
Now, if we take T =
(
4
√
2LD

)2
and run greedy with ′ =

4 , we obtain that σˆT is a 2-approximation Nash equilibrium
strategy for the defender up to additive loss , using a budget
of
(
ln
(
n

)
+O(1)
)
kd. Each iteration takes time O(nm +
m logm + mnαk) where the first term is to compute the
attacker’s gradient, the second to project onto their feasible
strategy set, and the third is to run greedy for the defender
(see the supplement for details).
Preference uncertainty
The previous two sections showed how to compute approxi-
mately optimal equilibrium strategies for the defender when
both players know the starting preferences of the voters ex-
actly. However, in practice the preferences will be subject to
uncertainty, complicating the problem of optimally targeting
resources. We now explore three models of preference un-
certainty, each of which makes an increasingly conservative
assumption about the information available to the defender.
In each case, we show how to extend our algorithmic tech-
niques to obtain approximately optimal defender strategies.
Stochastic uncertainty
We start with the least conservative assumption that the joint
preference profile of the voters is drawn from a distribution
which is known to both players. Each aims to maximize their
payoff in expectation over the unknown draw from this dis-
tribution. We show that in both the disjoint and nondisjoint
settings, the same algorithmic techniques go through with a
natural modification to account for uncertainty.
Recall that θ denotes the voter preferences. θ is now
drawn from a known joint distributionD. Let fθ(Sd, Sa) de-
note the expected number of voters who switch to ca under
preferences θ. The payoffs are given by Eθ∼D[fθ(Sd, Sa)].
Via linearity of expectation, we can write this as∑
v∈V
Pr[θv = 1]
∏
u∈Sd
(1− quv)
(
1−
∏
u∈Sa
1− puv
)
.
Dependence on the random preferences appears only
through the term Pr[θv = 1]. This has two important con-
sequences. First, we can evaluate the objective and imple-
ment the corresponding algorithms using access only to the
Algorithm 3 FPLT-Asymmetric()
1: Arbitrarily initialize S0d and S
0
a(θj)
2: for t = t...T do
3: Draw pja, pd uniformly at random from [0,
1
 ]
m
4: //TopK returns the set consisting of the indices of the
smallest k entries of the given vector
5: Sta(θj) = TopK(
∑t−1
s=1 `θj (S
s
d)+p
j
a, ka) j = 1...N
6: Std = TopK(
∑t−1
s=1
1
N
∑N
j=1 `θj (S
s
a(θj)) + pd, kd)
7: return {Sta} and {Std}
Algorithm 4 OG-Asymmetric(η, α, T, kaN)
1: Draw θ1...θN iid from D
2: x0i (θj) =
1
mka
for i = 1...m, j = 1...N
3: for t = 1...T do
4: Std = Greedy
(
1
N
∑N
j=1 g(·|xt−1(θj)), αkd
)
5: for j = 1...N do
6: ∇t(θj) = ∇F (xt−1(θj)|Std)
7: xt+1(θj) = Update(xt(θj),∇t(θj))
8: return {Std}
marginals of the distribution. For many distributions of in-
terest (e.g., product distributions where each voter adopts a
preference independently), these will be known explicitly,
and they can in general be evaluated to arbitrary precision
via random sampling. Second, since the probability term
is a nonnegative constant with respect to the strategies Sd
and Sa, the payoffs retain properties such as linearity (in
the disjoint case) or submodularity (in the nondisjoint case).
Accordingly, we can obtain exactly the same computational
guarantees as in the deterministic case, merely substituting
the above expression for the payoffs:
Theorem 6. By substituting Pr[θv = 1] for θv in the defini-
tion of f , FTPL achieves the same guarantee for the stochas-
tic objective as in Theorem 1. Further, making this substitu-
tion in the definition of F (x|Sd) and running Algorithm 2
yields the same guarantee as in Theorem 5.
Asymmetric uncertainty
We now consider a case where the true voter preferences are
still drawn from a distribution, but the players have access to
asymmetric information about the draw. Specifically, the de-
fender knows only the prior distribution, while the attacker
has access to the true realized draw. We aim to solve the
defender problem:
min
σd
E
θ∼D
[
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σd
[fθ (Sa, Sd)]
]
. (1)
Here, the defender minimizes in expectation over the dis-
tribution of voter preferences, but the attacker maximizes
knowing the actual draw θ ∼ D. We show how to compute
approximately optimal defender strategies for an arbitrary
distribution D, assuming only the ability to draw i.i.d. sam-
ples. We first prove a concentration bound for the number
of samples required to approximate the true problem over
defender mixed strategies with bounded support:
Lemma 2. Draw N = O
(
n2mT
2 log
(
1
δ
)
logm
)
samples.
With probability at least 1 − δ, for defender mixed strategy
σd with support size at most T ,∣∣∣ E
θ∼D
[
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σd
[fθ (Sa, Sd)]
]
−
1
N
N∑
i=1
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σd
[fθ (Sa, Sd)]
∣∣∣ ≤ 
We now give generalizations of our earlier algorithms for
the disjoint and nondisjoint settings. Each algorithm first
draws sufficient samples for Lemma 7 to hold. Then, it sim-
ulates a separate adversary for each of the samples, mimick-
ing the ability of the adversary to respond to the true draw
of θ. Each adversary runs a separate instance of a no-regret
learning algorithm (FTPL for the disjoint case and online
gradient for the nondisjoint case). In each iteration, the de-
fender updates according to the expectation over all of the
adversaries (since the defender does not know the true θ).
More precisely, in the disjoint case, the defender’s loss func-
tion in iteration t is given by the average of the loss func-
tions generated by each of the individual adversaries. The
defender takes a FTPL step according to this average loss.
In the nondisjoint case, the defender computes a greedy best
response where the objective is given by average influence
averted over all of the current adversary strategies. We show
the following approximation guarantee for each setting:
Theorem 7. Using inputs T = 4n
2 max{ka,kd}
2 , and N =
O
(
n2mT
2 log
(
1
δ
)
logm
)
for Algorithm 3, the uniform dis-
tribution over {Std} is an -equilibrium defender strategy.
Theorem 8. Run Algorithm 4 with T = 2L
2D2
2 iter-
ations, η = 1
L
√
2T
, α = ln n + O(1), and N =
O
(
n3T
2 log
(
1
δ
)
log n
)
samples. Let σˆT be the uniform dis-
tribution on S1d ...S
T
d . With probability at least 1 − δ, the
defender’s payoff using σˆT is bounded as
E
θ∼D
[
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σˆT
[fθ (Sa, Sd)]
]
≤ 2τ + .
where τ is the optimal value for Problem 1.
That is, the defender can obtain the same approximation
guarantee in the same number of iterations. Each iteration
takes time O(N(mn + m logm)) to update all of the ad-
versaries, while the defender best response problem still re-
quires one call to greedy as before.
Adversarial uncertainty
We now consider the most conservative uncertainty model,
in which the voters’ preferences are chosen adversarially
within some uncertainty set. Specifically, there is a nominal
Algorithm 5 FPLT-Adversarial()
1: Arbitrarily initialize S0d and S
0
a
2: for t = t...T do
3: Draw pa, pd uniformly at random from [0, 1 ]
m
4: //TopK returns the set consisting of the indices of the
smallest k entries of the given vector
5: Sta = TopK
([∑t−1
s=1 `(S
s
d) + pa
]
1:m
, ka
)
∪
6: TopK
([∑t−1
s=1 `(S
s
d) + pa
]
m+1:m+n
, `
)
7: Std = TopK(
∑t−1
s=1 `(S
s
a) + pd, kd)
8: return {Sta} and {Std}
Algorithm 6 OG-Adversarial(η, α, T, ka)
1: x0i =
1
mka
for i = 1...m+ n
2: for t = 1...T do
3: Std = Greedy(x
t−1, αkd)
4: ∇t = ∇F (xt−1|Std)
5: xt+11:m = Update(x
t
1:m,∇t1:m, ka)
6: xt+1m+1:m+n = Update
(
xtm+1:m+n,∇tm+1:m+n, `
)
7: return {Std}
preference profile θˆ (e.g., θˆ may be an estimate from histor-
ical data). We are guaranteed that the true θ lies within the
uncertainty set U` = {θ : |{v : θv 6= θˆv}| ≤ `}. That is,
the true θ may differ in up to ` places from our estimate. The
defender solves the robust optimization problem
min
σd
max
θ∈U`
max
Sa≤|ka|
E
Sd∼σd
[f(Sd, Sa)] (2)
which optimizes against the worst case θ ∈ U`. Note that
Problem 2 essentially places the choice of θ under the con-
trol of the attacker (formally, we can combine the two max
operations). We show that the attacker component of the al-
gorithms when payoffs are common knowledge can be gen-
eralized to handle this expanded strategy set. Essentially, the
attacker will now have two kinds of actions. First, select-
ing a channel for a fake news message (as before). Second,
directly reaching a given voter by changing their initial pref-
erence. We equivalently simulate the second class of actions
by adding a new channel v′ for each voter v. The new chan-
nel has qv′,v = 0 and pv′,v = 1. That is, the attacker always
succeeds in influencing v and can never be stopped by the
defender. The attacker’s pure strategy set now consists of all
choices of kd normal channels and ` of the new channels.
Our result from the disjoint case goes through essentially
unchanged. Algorithm 5 runs FTPL for both players, as be-
fore. The only change is in the linear optimization step for
the attacker, which now selects separately the top ka regular
channels and ` new channels (lines 5 and 6). We have the
following guarantee:
Theorem 9. Using T = 4n
2 max{ka+`,kd}
2 for Algorithm 5,
the uniform distribution over {Std} is an -equilibrium de-
fender strategy.
The main technical difference is in the nondisjoint case,
where the attacker’s problem now corresponds to submodu-
lar maximization over a partition matroid (since the budget
constraint is now split into two categories instead of a single
category as before). More general matroid constraints can
complicate submodular maximization, e.g., the greedy al-
gorithm no longer obtains the optimal approximation ratio.
Fortunately, our use of a continuous relaxation and online
gradient ascent for the attacker can be shown to generalize
without loss to arbitrary matroid constraints:
Theorem 10. After T iterations, let σˆT be the uniform dis-
tribution on S1d ...S
T
d output by Algorithm 6. The defender’s
payoff using σˆT (with respect to Problem 2) is bounded as
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σˆT
[f(Sd, Sa)] ≤ 2
(
τ + +
L2D2ka+`
2
√
T
)
.
Experiments
We now examine our algorithms’ empirical performance,
and what the resulting values reveal about the difficulty of
defending elections across different settings. We focus on
the nondisjoint setting for two reasons. First it is the more
general case. Second, FTPL is guaranteed to converge to an
-optimal strategy in the disjoint setting, while in the nondis-
joint setting is important to empirically assess our algo-
rithm’s approximation quality. Our experiments use the Ya-
hoo webscope dataset (Yahoo 2007). The dataset logs bids
placed by advertisers on a set of phrases. We create instances
where the phrases are advertising channels and the accounts
are voters. To generate each instance, we sample a random
subset of 100 channels and 500 voters. Each propagation
probability is drawn uniformly at random from [0, 0.2] for
each player. Each voter’s preference is also drawn uniformly
at random. All results are averaged over 30 iterations.
We start with fully known preferences and examine the
approximation quality of Algorithm 2. Importantly, we do
not increase the defender’s budget (i.e., α = 1). Empirically,
Algorithm 2 performs substantially better than its theoretical
guarantee, rendering bicriteria approximation unnecessary.
We use the mixed strategies that Algorithm 2 outputs to
compute upper and lower bounds on the value of the game.
The upper bound bu is the attacker’s best response to the
defender mixed strategy, while the lower bound b` is the de-
fender’s best response to the attacker mixed strategy. It is
easy to see that the defender cannot obtain utility better than
b`, and Algorithm 2’s mixed strategy guarantees utility no
worse than bu. Hence, we use bu−b`b` as an upper bound on
the optimality gap. Since finding exact best responses is NP-
hard, we use mixed integer programs (see the supplement).
Table 1 shows that Algorithm 2 computes highly accu-
rate defender equilibrium strategies across a range of values
for ka and kd. We use T = 50 iterations with η = 0.05.
The average optimality gap is always (provably) under 6%.
Moreover, this value is an upper bound, and the real gap
may be smaller. We conclude that Algorithm 2 is highly ef-
fective at computing near-optimal defender strategies. Next,
Figure 1 examines how the attacker’s payoff varies as a func-
tion of ka and kd. Even for large kd, the defender cannot
kd/ka 5 10 20
5 0.016± 0.007 0.016± 0.010 0.026± 0.015
10 0.017± 0.008 0.020± 0.008 0.037± 0.017
20 0.014± 0.006 0.025± 0.012 0.053± 0.022
Table 1: Upper bound on optimality gap for Algorithm 2.
Average over 30 instances; ± denotes standard deviation.
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Figure 1: Top left: Attacker’s payoff as the budget con-
straint for each player varies. Top right: attacker payoff
with stochastic uncertainty. Bottom left: asymmetric uncer-
tainty. Bottom right: adversarial uncertainty, varying the un-
certainty set size `.
completely erase the attacker’s impact (to be expected since
quv < 1 and so the defender’s message is not perfectly effec-
tive). However, the defender can obtain a large reduction in
the attacker’s influence when ka is high. The empirical pay-
offs are convex in kd, meaning that the defender achieves
this reduction with a moderate value of kd and sees little im-
provement afterwards. When ka is low, even large defender
expenditures have a relatively little impact. Intuitively, it is
harder for the defender to ensure an intersection between
their own strategy and the attacker’s when the attacker only
picks a small number of channels to begin with.
Next, we examine the impact of uncertainty. Figure 1
shows the attacker’s payoff under stochastic, asymmetric,
and adversarial uncertainty compared to fully known pay-
offs. Stochastic uncertainty leaves the attacker’s payoff vir-
tually identical. Surprisingly, this also holds for the asym-
metric case. However, in the adversarial setting, the at-
tacker’s payoff scales linearly with `, indicating that the
defender cannot mitigate the impact of such uncertainty.
Hence, the defender can benefit substantially from gather-
ing enough information to at least estimate the distribution
of θ, even if the attacker still has privileged information.
Conclusion: We introduce and study the problem of a de-
fender mitigating the impact of adversarial misinformation
on an election. Across a range of population structures and
uncertainty models, we provide polynomial time approxima-
tion algorithms to compute equilibrium defender strategies,
which empirically provide near-optimal payoffs. Our results
show that the defender can substantially benefit from mod-
est resource investments, and from gathering enough infor-
mation to estimate voter preferences.
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Hardness result
We reduce from maximum coverage to the defender equilibrium computation problem. Suppose that we are given a family
of sets S1...Sm from a universe U . The objective of maximum coverage is to select a subset T of k sets which maximize∣∣⋃
Si∈T Si
∣∣. We create an instance of our game as follows. Each set S corresponds to a channel uS and each element i ∈ U to
a voter vi. Each voter has θv = 1. Each uS has an edge to every vi such that i ∈ S. This edge has puv = 1 and quv = 1. The
attacker has budget ka = m and the defender has budget kd = k. Regardless of what the defender plays, an equilibrium strategy
for the attacker is the pure strategy which selects all of the channels. Hence, the defender’s equilibrium computation problem
is identical to finding the pure strategy which maximizes the number of voters reached, since the attacker always reaches every
voter, and every voter counts towards the objective since θv = 1. This is just the maximum coverage problem. Since it is
well-known that it is NP-hard to approximate maximum coverage to within a factor better than 1− 1/e, the theorem follows.
Analysis of FTPL
Theorem 11. Let k = max{ka, kd}. After 4n2k2 iterations of FTPL, the uniform distribution on each player’s history forms an
-equilibrium.
Proof. FTPL guarantees that after T iterations, the defender’s reward is bounded compared to the optimum as
T∑
t=1
1[Std]
>`(Sta)− max|S|≤kd
T∑
t=1
1[S]>`(Sta) ≤ n
√
kdT .
By adding and subtracting the constant term in the utility function and dividing by T , we get
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(Std, S
t
a)− max|S|≤kd
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(S, Sta) ≤
n
√
kd√
T
.
Applying the same reasoning from the perspective of the attacker yields
max
|S|≤ka
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(Std, S)−
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(Std, S
t
a) ≤
n
√
ka√
T
.
Let τ denote the value of the game and k = max{ka, kd}. We have
τ = min
σd
max
Sa≤|ka|
E
Sd∼σd
[f(Sd, Sa)]
≤ max
Sa≤|ka|
E
Sd∼σˆd
[f(Sd, Sa)]
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
f(Std, S
t
a) +
n
√
k√
T
(no regret guarantee for the attacker)
This implies that
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(Std, S
t
a) ≥ τ −
n
√
k√
T
and so
max
|S|≤kd
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(S, Sta) = max|S|≤kd
E
Sa∼σˆa
[f(S, Sta)] ≥ τ −
2n
√
k√
T
.
In other words, the empirical attacker strategy σˆa guarantees the attacker payoff at least τ − 2n
√
k√
T
against any pure strategy
for the defender. This implies that σˆa is a 2n
√
k√
T
-approximate equilibrium strategy for the attacker. The same line of reasoning
applied to the defender completes the argument.
Regret guarantee for online mirror ascent
We analyze the general online mirror ascent algorithm. Our analysis draws heavily on the analysis of online mirror descent
for convex functions in (Hazan and others 2016), to which refer the reader for additional background. Define the Bregman
divergence with respect to a function R as
BR(x||y) = R(x)−R(y)−∇R(y)>(x− y)
Let || · ||t be the norm induced by the Bregman divergence BR(xt||xt+1) and || · ||∗t be the corresponding dual norm. Let L
be an upper bound on ||∇t||∗t and D be an upper bound on maxx∈X R(x)−R(x1). We have the following general guarantee:
Theorem 12. Let F1...FT be a sequence of DR-submodular functions and∇t = ∇Ft. If we set η = 1L√2T then
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ft(xt) ≥ 1
2
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ft(x
∗)
)
−
√
2LD√
T
where x∗ = maxx∈X
∑T
t=1 Ft(x
∗).
Proof. We start out by relating regret to an intermediate quantity at each step:
Lemma 3.
∑T
t=1 Ft(x
∗)− 2Ft(xt) ≤
∑T
t=1∇>t (xt − xt+1) + 1ηD2
Proof. Define g0(x) = 1ηR(x), gt(x) = −∇>t x. Via Equation 7.2 of (Hassani, Soltanolkotabi, and Karbasi 2017), we have that
T∑
t=1
Ft(x
∗)− 2Ft(xt) ≤
T∑
t=1
∇>t (x∗ − xt)
=
T∑
t=1
−∇>t (xt − x∗)
=
T∑
t=1
gt(xt)− gt(x∗)
and so it suffices to bound
∑T
t=1 gt(xt)− gt(x∗). As a first step, we show
Lemma 4. For any u ∈ X ,∑Tt=0 gt(u) ≥∑Tt=0 gt(xt+1)
Proof. By induction on T . For the base case, we have that x1 = arg minx∈X R(X) and so g0(u) ≥ g0(x1). Now assume for
some T ′ that
T ′∑
t=0
gt(u) ≥
T ′∑
t=0
gt(xt+1).
Now we will prove that the statement holds for T ′ + 1. Since xT ′+2 = arg minx∈X
∑T ′+1
t=0 gt(x) we have
T ′+1∑
t=0
gt(u) ≥
T ′+1∑
t=0
gt(xT ′+2)
=
T ′∑
t=0
gt(xT ′+2) + gT ′+1(xT ′+2)
≥
T ′∑
t=0
gt(xt+1) + gT ′+1(xT ′+2)
=
T ′+1∑
t=0
gt(xt+1).
where the third line uses the induction hypothesis for u = xT ′+2.
Accordingly we have
T∑
t=1
gt(xt)− gt(x∗) ≤
T∑
t=1
[gt(xt)− gt(xt+1)] + g0(x1)− g0(x∗)
=
T∑
t=1
gt(xt)− gt(xt+1) + 1
η
(R(x1)−R(x∗))
≤
T∑
t=1
gt(xt)− gt(xt+1) + 1
η
D2
which concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
We now proceed to prove the main theorem. Define Φt(x) =
∑t
s=1−η∇>s x + R(x). Using the definition of the Bregman
divergence, we have that
Φt(xt) = Φt(xt+1) + (xt − xt+1)>∇Φt(xt+1) +BΦt(xt||xt+1)
≥ Φt(xt+1) +BΦt(xt||xt+1)
= Φt(xt+1) +BR(xt||xt+1).
The inequality uses the fact that xt+1 minimizes Φt over X . The last equality uses the fact that the term −∇>s x is linear and
doesn’t affect the Bregman divergence. Thus,
BR(xt||xt+1) ≤ Φt(xt)− Φt(xt+1)
= (Φt−1(xt)− Φt−1(xt+1))− η∇>t (xt − xt+1)
≤ −η∇>(xt − xt+1)
Let || · ||t be the norm induced by BR at the point xt, xt+1 and || · ||∗t be its dual norm. Via the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
−∇>t (xt − xt+1) ≤ ||∇t||∗t · ||xt+1 − xt||t
= ||∇t||∗t ·
√
2BR(xt||xt+1)
≤ ||∇t||∗t ·
√
2η(−∇t)>(xt − xt+1)
which implies
−∇>t (xt − xt+1) ≤ 2η (||∇t||∗t )2 .
Combining this with Lemma 3 and optimizing over the choice of η now suffices to prove the theorem.
Now, the theorem in the main text is obtained by specializing the regularizer R to obtain the Euclidean and exponentiated
gradient updates. For the Euclidean update, we can take R(x) = 12 ||x − x0||22 for any x ∈ X . We thus obtain the standard
Euclidean projection (see (Hazan and others 2016) for details). For the exponentiated gradient update, we can take R(x) =∑
i xi log xi. We now derive the associated projection. Writing down the Bregman divergence induced by the negative entropy,
we want to solve the projection problem
x = arg min
{x:||x||1≤k,0≤xi≤1}
∑
i
xi log
(
xi
yi
)
−
∑
i
xi −
∑
i
yi
This gives the Lagrangian
F (x, λ, ν) =
∑
i
xi log
(
xi
yi
)
−
∑
i
xi −
∑
i
yi + λ
(∑
i
xi − k
)
+
∑
i
νi (xi − 1) .
At the minimizer, the KKT conditions require
d
dxi
F (x, λ, ν) = log
(
xi
yi
)
+ λ+ νi = 0
d
dλ
F (x, λ, ν) =
(∑
i
xi
)
− 1 = 0
d
dνi
F (x, λ, ν) = xi − 1 = 0
Solving for x in the first equation yields xi = yie−(λ+νi). Now if we set
λ = ln
∑
i min{1, yi}
k
νi =
{
ln yi if yi ≥ 1
0 otherwise
it is easy to check that complementary slackness, as well as the second and third equations (primal feasibility) are also
satisfied. Hence, (x, λ, ν) form an optimal solution.
We remark that the bounds on L and D for each setting are well-known because they are the same as for mirror ascent in the
offline case; see (Hassani, Soltanolkotabi, and Karbasi 2017; Wilder 2018) for details.
Defender best response
We prove here that greedy best responses with an expanded budget guarantee the defender an optimal best response, up to
additive error . We start out with a useful characterization of the surrogate function g:
Theorem 13. For any attacker mixed strategy σa, g is a monotone submodular function.
Proof. We write out the objective as
g(Sd) = E
Sa∼σa
[∑
v∈V
[
1−
∏
u∈Sa
1− puv
]
−
∑
v∈V
(
1−
∏
u∈Sa
1− puv
) ∏
u∈Sd
1− quv
]
= E
Sa∼σa
[∑
v∈V
(
1−
∏
u∈Sa
1− puv
)(
1−
∏
u∈Sd
1− quv
)]
.
Now, it is easy to see that for g is a nonnegative linear combination of submodular functions (one for each fixed draw of Sa
and v ∈ V ).
Theorem 14. Suppose that we run the greedy algorithm on the function g with a budget of ln
(
n

)
kd. Then, the resulting set
Sd satisfies
E
Sa∼σa
[f(Sd, Sa)] ≤ min|S∗|≤kd ESa∼σa [f(Sd, Sa)] + .
Proof. Applying Lemma 5 with ` = ln
(
n

)
kd yields that g(Sd) ≥
(
1− n
)
g(S∗). Translating this in terms of the original
function f , we have that
E
Sa∼σa
[f(Sd, Sa)] = E
Sa∼σa
[f(∅, Sa)]− g(Sd)
≤ E
Sa∼σa
[f(∅, Sa)]−
(
1− 
n
)
g(S∗)
= E
Sa∼σa
[f(S∗, Sa)] +

n
g(S∗)
≤ E
Sa∼σa
[f(S∗, Sa)] + 
= min
|S|≤kd
E
Sa∼σa
[f(S, Sa)] + 
where the first inequality uses Lemma 5, the second inequality uses that g(S∗) ≤ n, and the final equality uses that S∗ is an
optimal solution for both maximizing g and minimizing E [f(·, Sa)] (since the two problems only differ by a constant).
Lemma 5. After ` iterations, the set S` maintained by greedy satisfies
g(S`) ≥
(
1− e− `kd
)
max
|S∗|≤kd
g(S∗).
Proof. Let v` be the item selected in iteration `. As a consequence of submodularity, we have
g(S∗ ∪ S`−1)− g(S`−1) ≤
∑
v∈S∗\S`−1
g(S`−1 ∪ {v})− g(S`−1)
≤ |S∗ \ S`−1| ·max
v∈V
g(S`−1 ∪ {v})− g(S`−1)
≤ kdg(S`−1 ∪ {v`})− g(S`−1)
= kd(g(S`)− g(S`−1))
which implies
g(S`)− g(S`−1) ≥ 1
kd
g(S∗ ∪ S`−1)− g(S`−1)
and so
g(S∗)− g(S`) ≤ g(S∗ ∪ S`)− g(S`) ≤
(
1− 1
kd
)
(g(S∗ ∪ S`−1)− g(S`−1)) .
Since S0 = ∅, g(S∗ ∪ S0)− g(S0) = g(S∗). Applying induction, we obtain that after ` iterations,
g(S∗)− g(S`) ≤
(
1− 1
kd
)`
g(S∗) ≤ e− `kd g(S∗)
which proves the lemma.
Nondisjoint case
We now prove the full approximation guarantee for the defender in the nondisjoint case. We start out with a simple lemma,
essentially capturing that the attacker does not gain any expressive power by optimizing over the relaxed continuous space
instead of distributions over their feasible set.
Lemma 6. For any monotone submodular function f and x ∈ X , there exists S with |S| ≤ k such that f(S) ≥ ES′∼x[f(S′)]
Proof. This is a simple consequence of known rounding algorithms for the multilinear extension of a monotone submodular
function over matroid polytopes (e.g., swap rounding (Chekuri, Vondrak, and Zenklusen 2010) or pipage rounding (Calinescu
et al. 2011)). Since such algorithms produce a random set S satisfying E[f(S)] ≥ ES′∼x[f(S′)], the desired set must exist by
the probabilistic method.
Now we proceed to the main result:
Theorem 15. After T iterations, let σˆT be the uniform distribution on S1d ...STd . The defender’s payoff using σˆT is bounded as
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σˆT
[f(Sd, Sa)] ≤ 2
(
τ + +
√
2LD√
T
)
.
Proof. We can upper bound τ , the value of the game, by combining the no-regret guarantee for the attacker and the best response
guarantee for the defender as follows:
τ = min
σ∗
max
Sa≤|ka|
E
Sd∼σ∗
[f(Sd, Sa)]
≥ min
σ∗
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
Sa∼xta,Sd∼σ∗
[f(Sd, Sa)] (Lemma 6)
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
min
σ∗
E
Sa∼xta,Sd∼σ∗
[f(Sd, Sa)]
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
min
|Sd|≤kd
E
Sa∼xta
[f(Sd, Sa)]
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
E
Sa∼xta
[
f(Std, Sa)
]−  (best response guarantee for defender)
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ft(x
t
a)−  (definition of the multilinear extension)
≥ 1
2
max
x∗∈X
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ft(x
∗)−
√
2LD√
T
−  (no-regret guarantee for attacker)
≥ 1
2
max
|Sa|≤ka
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ft(1Sa)−
√
2LD√
T
− 
=
1
2
max
|Sa|≤ka
1
T
T∑
t=1
f(Std, Sa)−
√
2LD√
T
− 
=
1
2
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σˆT
[f(Sd, Sa)]−
√
2LD√
T
− .
and now rearranging the terms yields
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σˆT
[f(Sd, Sa)] ≤ 2
(
τ +
√
2LD√
T
+ 
)
as claimed.
For the runtime, we note that iteration has three steps. First, we need to compute a gradient for the attacker. This can be done
in closed form and involves a sum over n terms (one for each voter). By appropriately storing intermediate products for each
voter, gradient computation takesO(mn) time total . Next, we need to project onto the attacker’s feasible set. For the Euclidean
case, this can be done in time O(m logm) (Karimi et al. 2017). For the exponentiated gradient update, the computations in
Algorithm 2 take time O(m). Lastly, we need to run greedy for the defender. In the worst case, greedy will need to evaluate
every item at every iteration, resulting in mαk evaluations of the function g. Each evaluation takes time O(n), again by storing
intermediate products. Combining these figures yields the runtime bound in the main paper.
Asymmetric uncertainty
Lemma 7. Draw N = O
(
n3T
2 log
(
1
δ
)
log n
)
samples. With probability at least 1 − δ, for every distribution σd over the
defender’s pure strategy space with support size at most T ,
∣∣∣ E
θ∼D
[
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σd
[fθ (Sa, Sd)]
]
−
1
N
N∑
i=1
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σd
[fθ (Sa, Sd)]
∣∣∣ ≤ 
Proof. We will first prove that the statement holds for any fixed σd, and then calculate the number of additional samples
needed in order to take union bound over all σdeff with support size at most T . For any fixed σd and θ, define the random
variable Y (σd, θ) = max|Sa|≤ka ESd∼σd [fθ (Sa, Sd)]. Since for any pure strategies Sa, Sd and any θ, fθ (Sa, Sd) ∈ [0, n]
(i.e., there are at most n voters so at most n can switch), we also have Y (σd) ∈ [0, n]. Accordingly, Hoeffding’s inequality
yields that with N = O
(
n2
2 log
1
δ
)
independent samples from D, we have that
∣∣∣Eθ∼D [Y (σd, θ)]− 1N ∑Ni=1 Y (σd, θi)∣∣∣ ≤
. Since there are
(
n
kd
)
defender pure strategies, there are at most
(
n
kd
)T
distributions of support size at most T . Note that
log
(
n
kd
)T ≤ O (Tn log n). Therefore, if we take N = O (n3T2 log ( 1δ ) log n), union bound over all σd yields the statement in
the lemma.
Theorem 16. Run Algorithm 4 with T = 2L
2D2
2 iterations, η =
1
L
√
2T
, α = ln n + O(1), and N = O
(
n3T
2 log
(
1
δ
)
log n
)
samples. Let σˆT be the uniform distribution on S1d ...S
T
d . With probability at least 1 − δ, the defender’s payoff using σˆT is
bounded as
E
θ∼D
[
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σˆT
[fθ (Sa, Sd)]
]
≤ 2τ + .
Proof. Let σ∗ denote an optimal defender mixed strategy. We have taken N sufficiently high for Lemma 7 to guarantee that
a finite sum over the samples approximates the expectation over θ up to error . We will use this fact over two classes of
distributions. First all distributions of support size at most T , where T is the number of iterations run. Second, the single
distribution σ∗ (which can be included in the union bound over the first class with only a constant increase in the number of
samples). Now we can bound the attacker’s payoff in relation to the value of the game as
τ = E
θ∼D
[
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σ∗
[fθ (Sa, Sd)]
]
≥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σ∗
[fθi (Sa, Sd)]−  (Lemma 7)
≥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
Sd∼σ∗,Sa∼xta
[fθi (Sa, Sd)]− 
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
min
σ′
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
Sd∼σ′,Sa∼xta
[fθi (Sa, Sd)]− 
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
min
|Sd|≤kd
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
Sa∼xta
[fθi (Sa, Sd)]− 
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
E
Sa∼xta
[
fθi
(
Sa, S
t
d
)]− 2 (defender best response guarantee)
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
N
N∑
i=1
F tθi(x
t
a)− 2
=
1
2
1
N
N∑
i=1
max
x∗∈X
1
T
T∑
t=1
F tθi (x
∗)− 3 (adversary no-regret guarantee)
=
1
2
1
N
N∑
i=1
max
|Sa|≤ka
1
T
T∑
t=1
fθi
(
Sa, S
t
d
)− 3
=
1
2
1
N
N∑
i=1
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σˆT
[fθi (Sa, Sd)]− 3
≥ 1
2
E
θ∼D
[
max
|Sa|≤ka
E
Sd∼σˆT
[fθ (Sa, Sd)]
]
− 3 (Lemma 7).
Now, the theorem follows by applying the above argument with 3 .
Adversarial uncertainty
Note that our no-regret guarantee for the attacker holds with respect to an arbitrary convex set. Hence, we can replace the
uniform matroid polytope with the partition matroid polytope and obtain a no-regret guarantee with respect to the new attacker
action space. The only other claim specific to the constraint set is Lemma 6, which holds for arbitrary matroid constraints.
Hence, the theorem follows by the same argument as the nondisjoint case, substituting a bound on D for the enlarged constraint
set.
Mixed integer programs for best response
We describe the basic idea behind the MIPs used in the experiments to compute upper bounds on the optimality gap for our
algorithms. The basic idea is to use sample average approximation to linearize the expected number of voters reached by a
given strategy. We will discuss just the attacker best response; the defender best response is similar. The objective for any fixed
Sd is
f(Sd, Sa) =
∑
v∈V
θv
( ∏
u∈Sd
1− quv
)(
1−
∏
u∈Sa
1− puv
)
where the term cv := θv
(∏
u∈Sd 1− quv
)
is a constant (with respect to Sa) and can be precomputed. We will have a set of Z
sampled scenarios (we used Z = 200). In each scenario i = 1...Z we will maintain a set of variables riv denoting whether each
voter has been reached. In scenario i, we include each edge in the graph independently with probability puv . Let ei(v) denote
the set of channels which reach voter v in scenario i. We will associated each channel u with a binary variable χu denoting
whether the channel is selected. Then, we can obtain the optimal attacker best response by solving the following MIP:
max
∑
i
∑
v
cvr
v
i
rvi ≤
∑
u∈ei(v)
χu ∀i = 1...Z, v ∈ V
∑
u∈C
χu ≤ ka
χu ∈ {0, 1} ∀u ∈ C
rvi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i = 1...Z, v ∈ V
The only difference in the defender case is the computation of the constant cv .
